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INTRODUCTION

In the decade after the Second World War a few outstanding
statesmen believed that the transfer of sovereign powers from the
nation-states of Western Europe to a supranational organization

would lead to an era of European accord through political and
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economic integration.1 Although nationalism has not lost its
meaning, the European Community 2 has since acquired sufficient
administrative, legislative, and judicial sovereign rights through
integration to establish itself as a new legal order in Western Europe. The most recent development contributing to European integration, the implementation of the decisions granting the Community financial autonomy, has far greater implications for
Europe than the mere restructuring of Community-Member
State 4 relations. In the larger debate on the international legal
personality of the European Community, the acquisition of
budget control powers by the supranational organization represents a significant transfer of sovereignty from the Member
States to the Community which enhances its claim to personality.
This latest move toward integration provides an opportunity to

examine the international legal personality of the European

Community.
II.

A.

LEGAL PERSONALITY AND INTEGRATION THEORY

Significance of InternationalLegal Personality

According to legal scholar Hans Kelsen, a legal person "is that
legal substance to which duties and rights belong as legal qualities."5 As a subject of the legal system, a legal person has rights
and duties, or more accurately stated, is rights and duties: "[T]he
legal person is not a separate entity besides 'its' rights and duties,
1. Jean Monnet, Paul-Henri Spaak, Alcide de Gasperi, and Konrad
Adenauer were among the most prominent statesmen for European integration.
2. The European Community, generally known as the Common Market,
comprises the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European

Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and the European Economic Community (EEC).
3. Decision on Replacement of Financial Contributions, Apr. 21, 1970, 13
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 94) 19 (1970), reprinted in OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY, TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITIES 843 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TREATms]. Since January 1, 1980,

all Member States furnish the Community with their customs duties, agricultural levies, and a percentage of their value added tax. This creates financing
referred to as the Community's own resources. See infra text accompanying
notes 136-50.
4. The Member States of the European Community are Belgium, Denmark,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, West Germany, and
the United Kingdom.
5. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 93 (1945).
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but only their personified unity or-since duties and rights are
legal norms-the personified unity of legal norms."' To say that
an entity has legal personality is to maintain that it has rights
and duties within the legal order.
Whether an international organization possesses legal personality is important for several reasons. First, an international legal
personality can bring international claims and have claims
brought against it.7 Second, a determination that international organizations have legal personality alters the definition of international law. Under traditional theories of international law only
sovereign states have rights and duties in the international legal
system, because they are the only entities that can possess international legal personality.8 Conventional theorists who equate international legal personality with sovereignty grant legal personality only to those entities (states) which have full sovereign
powers.9 In many respects, however, this theory obscures reality.
During this century, it has become increasingly apparent that
entities other than states are significant actors in the international arena. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized

this development in its Advisory Opinion on Reparationsfor Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations0 (Reparations Case). The ICJ recognized that international legal personality was an open-ended and relative concept; international law had
not absolutely defined the category of international persons.1 1

6. Id.
7. 5 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, THE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 6-17
(1976). A determination that an international organization such as the European
Community has an international legal personality has significance to the practi-

tioner. Consider a scenario in which the Common Market expropriates the property of a business incorporated under the laws of the United States or breaks a
contract with that corporation. Assume that this action violates international
law. Dissatisfied with remedies available in the European Court of Justice, the
United States corporation may want the State Department of the United States
to assert an international claim on its behalf for compensation in an international tribunal other than the International Court of Justice. H. STEINER & D.
VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 205-06 (2d ed. 1976). The Statute of

the International Court of Justice only permits states to appear as parties before
it. See STATUTE OF THE I.C.J. art. 34 (1945). This Recent Development provides

the theoretical basis upon which a practitioner could support such a claim.
8.

T.

HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENcE

395 (1928).

9. Id.
10. 1949 I.C.J. 174.
11.

Lissitzyn, TerritorialEntities Other than Independent States in the
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The subjects of international law, those entities possessing legal
personality and therefore certain rights and duties in the world
legal order, are not only the sovereign states.
B. Approaches to Determining InternationalLegal
Personality
In the Reparations Case, the ICJ concluded that the United
Nations, an organization, was an international legal person. Since
the United Nations is not a state, the ICJ declared that it does
not have the same rights and duties as does a state. 12 The ICJ,
maintained that the international organization was nevertheless,
a legal person capable of possessing international rights and duties, including the capacity to bring international claims. 13 The
United Nations had international legal personality because
it per1
formed certain functions in the international arena. 4
This functional approach to the determination of whether an

entity has international legal personality requires an examination
of the external relations of the entity. As an entity begins to assert itself in international affairs by exercising sovereign functions, the entity acquires international legal personality.15 Finn
Seyersted, among others, has adopted the Reparations Case approach for the ascertainment of the objective legal personality of
an international organization."8 He believes that the external relations of an organization establish whether or not the organization
possesses international legal personality, and that the internal
constitution or charter of the organization creates limits on the
exercise of that personality.1 7 Once an entity has international leLaw of Treaties, 125 RECUEIL DES CouRs 14 (1968). The International Law Commission noted as a principle of international law that entities other than states
might possess international legal personality. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 137.
12. Reparationrs Case, supra note 10, at 178-79.
13. Id. at 179-80.
14. Id.
15. F. SEYERSTED, OBJECTIVE INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 28-29 (1963).

16. Id. at 46.
17. ReparationsCase, supranote 10, at 179-80. This view reaffirms the position taken by the ICJ in the Reparations Case. "Whereas a State possesses the
totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law, the

rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization (United Nations) must
depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its consti-
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gal personality it has the same legal capacities as a state subject
to the limitations of its internal constituent documents. 18
International jurist D.P. O'Connell has criticized the method of
analysis employed in the Reparations Case and espoused by
Seyersted. O'Connell writes:
It is a mistake to jump to the conclusion that an organization has
personality and then deduce specific capacities from an a priori
conception of the concomitants of personality. The correct approach is to equate personality with capacities, and to inquire what
capacities are functionally implied in the entity concerned.1
The major theoretical flaw with the Seyersted approach is that it
assumes that every entity deemed to have international legal personality has certain legal capacities as a consequence of possessing that personality. In actuality, different kinds of international
persons have different capacities.2 0 If an entity has certain capaci-

ties as specified or implied in its charter, then it has international
legal personality to perform those functions; the converse is not
necessarily true.2 1 As O'Connell states, "[P]ersonality is not,
therefore, a synonym for capacity to perform acts X, Y, and Z; it
is an index, not of capacity per se, but of specific and different

capacities. ' 22 International legal personality is the sum of the capacities of an international entity as construed from the functions
of that entity.2 3 Accordingly, the ICJ in the Reparations Case

"was wrong in asserting that the capacity to bring a claim automatically derives from the existence of personality. ' 24 The capacity to bring international claims may arise by necessary implication from the constituent documents of an international
organization, but this capacity is not the immediate product of an
ascertainment of international legal personality.25
This Recent Development will use the integrationist approach
to assess the international legal personality of the European Community. Since the integrationist approach is a rejection of the
tutent documents and developed in practice." Id.
18. F. SEYERSTED, supra note 15, at 17.
98

19.

1 D. O'CONNELL,

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Lissitzyn, supra note 11, at 15.
Id.
1 D. O'CONNFLL, supra note 19, at 82.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1970).
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Seyersted approach, there is no need to examine the Community's attempts to exercise particular rights and duties in its external relations in an effort to determine its international legal
personality. Instead, the international legal personality of the European Community will be indexed through an examination of
the powers expressly given to it in its constituent documents, the
powers conferred upon it by necessary implication, and the powers developed in customary practice. The powers of the European
Community were initially created by the transfer of sovereignty
from the Member States to the supranational organization."8 As
this process continues, the internal measures taken by the Member States to further Western European integration will result in
the granting of more functions to the Community, and thereby to
the assignment of a greater degree of international legal personality to that entity. Integration theorist Pierre Pescatore maintains
that "the attribution of international prsonality is conceivable
only if an international organization is based upon a sufficient
unity of interests and action which would enable it to engage in
coherent action in the international arena.

27

The idealized no-

tion of a "United States of Europe" possessing all the rights and
duties of a state becomes less a fiction and more of a reality as
the Community acquires more sovereign powers. This Recent Development will thus review the trend towards European integration with particular emphasis on the events in the evolution of
financial autonomy for the European Community to assess its international legal personality.

III. TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
A. Formation of the ECSC
World War II destroyed the notion of an omnipotent nationstate. 28 The states of Western Europe realized that interdependence, not independence, was the key to economic and political
survival in the post-war years.2 9 Accordingly, in 1948 the Benelux
26. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
preamble, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
27. E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMuNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE

932 (1976); see Pescatore, Les relations extgrieures

des Communautgs Europenes, 103 RECUEUL DES COURs 1, 37-39 (1961).
28. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrIS

29.

Id.

118 (2d ed. 1976).
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countries 0 formed a free trade area based on the principle that
neighboring countries should eliminate common border taxes to
present a common import duty frontier to the rest of the world.3 1
At the same time, a few European leaders32 developed the idea
that international control of raw materials would eliminate the
competition in armaments and economics that leads to war.3 3 The
1951 Treaty of Paris (ECSC Treaty)3 which created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), removed essential war
resources from the individual national control of the Benelux
countries. The ECSC was more than an intergovernmental organization. The ECSC Treaty established supranational institutions
which were capable of actions binding Member States; the High
Authority, Council of Ministers (Council), Assembly (Parliament), and the Court of Justice (Court). 5 Acting independently
of the signatory governments, the ECSC managed a common
market in coal and steel, controlled investments and scientific research, and imposed common taxes for the maintenance of the
organization.3

30. These are Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg.

31. R. GURLAND & A. MACLEAN, THE COMMON MARKET: A COMMON SENSE
GUME FOR AMERICANS 14 (1974).
32. See supra note 1.
33. In the Schuman Plan, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman proposed that France and Germany place their coal and steel production
under a common authority and invited other European States to do the same. L.
LoRErTE, LE MARCHA, COMMUN 38 (1961).
34. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty].
35. Id. art. 7. The High Authority, id., is now commonly referred to as the
Commission and performs administrative functions as the community's executive organ. The Assembly is a political body composed of elected representatives
from the Member States with limited budgetary and control powers. The Council of Ministers is an intergovernmental institution composed of one minister
from each of the Member State governments with the authority to enact Commission initiatives. Finally, the Court of Justice has one judge from each Member State and interprets Community law. The three European Communities
share a common Commission, Parliament, Council, and Court, Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission, Apr. 8, 1965, 10 O.J. EuPm Comm.
(No. 152) 2 (1967), reprintedin TREATIES, supranote 3, at 785 [hereinafter cited
as Merger Treaty].

36. D.

LASOK &

J. BRMGE, supra note 28, at 12.
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B. Establishment of Two New Communities
The ECSC proved that supranational institutions could function despite diverse national interests.37 Drawing on this experience, the Foreign Ministers of "the Six" 38 founding countries met
in June 1955 and proclaimed their intention "to pursue the establishment of a United Europe through the development of common institutions, a progressive fusion of national economies, the
creation of a Common Market and a harmonization of social policies."39 On March 25, 1957, these Member States signed the
Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty) establishing the European Economic Community (EEC).4 ° On the same day, the Six organized
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) which
was designed to pool joint resources to reduce the cost of nuclear
research and development. 4 1 Thus, three distinct economic communities united Western Europe in 1957.
C. The Merger Treaty and Constitutional Crisis
The European Community concurrently moved toward integration and disintegration in the mid 1960's. France vetoed the admission of the United Kingdom to the Common Market in both
1963 and 1965.42 During this period of strained relations between
the advocates of socioeconomic integration and the proponents of
national sovereignty, the Commission presented a number of proposals to the Council.4' This reform package included farm price

regulations, the institution of the Community's own resources,
37. Id. at 13.

38. They are Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and West
Germany.
39. L. LoRETE, supra note 33, at 60.
40. EEC Treaty, supra note 26.

41. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25,
1957, preamble, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter cited as EURATOM Treaty].
42. E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 27, at 5-6. General de
Gaulle's insistence on an independent French nucleai force posed an insur-

mountable obstacle to further political integration in the Community during the
early sixties. The French president had previously forestalled discussion of the
creation of the European Defense Community with an integrated military

budget. De Gaulle vetoed British entry into the Common Market in 1963 and
1965, declaring that the United Kingdom was not ready for membership. Id.
43. EEC COMM'N Doc. (No. 65) 150 (1965), cited in 5 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG,
supra note 7, at 5-698. The Council fixed a deadline of June 30, 1965, for the
resolution of these issues. See infra text accompanying note 45.
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and enhanced budgetary powers for the European Parliament. 44
While the debate on the Commission proposals progressed, the
Six signed the Merger Treaty4 5 establishing a single Council, a
single Commission, a common budget, and a single board of auditors for the three Communities.4 6 The Merger Treaty unified certain elements of the three financial regimes but did not consolidate the three Community treaties or alter the powers of the
executive organs of the entire Community. 47 Commentators regarded the Merger Treaty as a significant step in European
integration. 8
Two months after the merger of the three Communities, however, France blocked the adoption of the aforementioned Commission proposals. Preferring that the Council make decisions by
unanimous agreement of the Member States, France objected
that the integrationist tendencies of the Commission portended
autonomous power for the Community and refused to partici-

pate.4 9 France did not rejoin the Community until seven months
later when the Member States reached a compromise known as
the Accords de Luxembourg (Accords).8 0 Commentators have suggested that the Accords did little more than establish an agreement to disagree, 51 and they did have a permanent and unsettling
effect on European integration. On the question of voting in the
Council, the Accords required the Council to seek unanimous
agreement on issues involving very important interests of a signa44. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 28, at 117.
45. Merger Treaty, supra note 35.

46. Id. chs. 1-3.
47. The Merger Treaty provided for a single budget encompassing the

budget of the EEC and the administrative budgets of EURATOM and the
ECSC. F. GRIEVES, SUPRANATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 121
(1969). The research and investment budgets of EURATOM were incorporated
into the unified budget, but kept separate from the operational expenditures of
the ECSC. The Treaty Amending Certain Budgetary Provisions, Apr. 22, 1970,
14 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 2) 1 (1971), reprinted in TREATIES, supra note 3, at
855.
48. K. SAVAGE, THE STORY OF THE COMMON MARKET 13-14 (1969).
49. E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 27, at 63. The French
Foreign Minister, serving as President of the Council at the time of the expiration of the June deadline for adoption of the Commission's reforms, refused to
extend the time limit. Subsequently, France invoked its "empty chair" policy.
50. ECSC, EEC & EURATOM, 9TH GEN. REP. 31-33 (1966).
51. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 28, at 118.
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tory nation.2 Community observers 53 maintained that the Accords virtually eliminated the possibility of a qualified majority
vote5 4 in the Council, and therefore weakened a supranational
feature of the Community treaties. Consequently, the Nine renounced the unanimous consent provision of the Accords in
1974. 55 Nevertheless, the Accords continue to block European integration by providing a quasi-legitimate basis for Member State
assertions of national sovereignty in opposition to the otherwise
supranational decisions of the Community."

52. E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 27, at 65. The Accords
did not define the meaning of "important national interests" nor state any
course of action for situations in which the Council could not reach unanimous
agreement. D. LASOIC & J. BRIDGE, supra note 28, at 118. Since the Council did
not follow the requisite procedures set out in article 236 of the EEC Treaty for
treaty amendment nor those provided in article 219 for treaty interpretation in
formulating the Accords, the legal validity of the voting compromise agreement
was questionable. D. LAsOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 51, at 119. In fact, it was in
direct conflict with article 148 which clearly states that the Council only requires
a vote of a qualified majority to act. See infra note 54.

53. Address by Professor Eric Stein, regular meeting of the University Research Club (Feb. 20, 1974), reprinted in L. QUADRANGLE (Univ. Mich. Law
Alumni), May 1974, at 10.
54. EEC Treaty article 148 demands only a qualified majority vote to carry
an issue. See supra note 26. The Treaty, however, requires a unanimous vote in
certain instances, id. arts. 14(7), 45(3), 59, 76, 93(2), 136, 188, 223, 227, but most
notably on Treaty amendments, id. art. 236, and treaties of accession, id. art.
237. A qualified majority is established by obtaining 45 votes in favor based on
the following weighted scale of Member State votes:
Belgium

5

Ireland

Denmark

3

Italy

Germany

10

Luxembourg

2

Greece

5

Netherlands

5

France

10

4 H. SMIT & P.

3
10

United Kingdom

10

Total Votes:

63

HERZOG, supra note 7, at 5-108 & Supp. 1979 at 36; Act Concerning the
Accession of the Hellenic Republic, May 28, 1979, reprinted in 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L
291) 17, 20 (1979).
55. Summit Meeting of the Heads of Government of the Nine Countries of
the European Community, Paris, Dec. 9 and 10, 1974.
56. See D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 28, at 120.
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D. Formationof European Political Cooperation
The first major step toward political integration within the European Community began in 1969 at the Hague Summit Conference. The Heads of State of the member governments adopted a
resolution instructing the Foreign Ministers to make proposals for
the achievement of political union among the Common Market
countries. 57 Subsequently, the Foreign Ministers established Eu-

ropean Political Cooperation 8 (EPC) as a new institution to de-

velop a common foreign policy for the Community. Quarterly
meetings of the Foreign Ministers augment an efficient network
for exchanging daily telegrams on foreign policy issues.59
Since European Political Cooperation is not a part of the EEC
Treaty, the Ministers meet outside the institutional framework of
the Common Market.60 This separate existence created a conflict
between the EPC and the Community concerning the lack of responsibility of this political union to the internal organs of the
Common Market.6 1 Although European Political Cooperation
presents an annual report to the European Parliament on its activities, 2 this consultation procedure was not deemed sufficient to
coordinate the activities of the two supranational institutions.6
Accordingly, the Heads of State assembled in Paris in December
1974 and established the European Council as the supreme authority governing both the Community and European Political
Cooperation."
57.

ECSC, EEC & EURATOM, 3D GEN. REP. 15 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
REP.].
58. The Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is known as European
Political Cooperation.
59. Saving the EEC, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1981, at 11, 12.
3D GEN.

60. Wellenstein, Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations, 16 COMMON MKT. L. Rv. 420 (1979).
61. 6 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 6-236, 6-237.
62. ECSC, EEC & EURATOM, 9Th

GEN. REP. 17 (1975)

[hereinafter cited as

9TH GEN. REP.]; Report on Political Cooperation,BuL. Eum. COMM'N, (No. 10)
129 (1979).
63.

ECSC, EEC & EURATOM,

8TH GEN.

REP. 297 (1974) [hereinafter cited

as 8TH GEN. REP.].

64. Wellenstein, supra note 60, at 422. To facilitate the coordination of the
activities of European Political Cooperation and the Community, the Paris
Summit provided that the Commission would have representation at all meetings of the EPC and that the Foreign Ministers would meet biannually with the
Political Affairs Committee of the Parliament. Additionally, the members of the
European Parliament may submit questions to the EPC. ECSC, EEC &
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European Political Cooperation has served many important
functions in European integration. Not only has it become "the
world's most advanced model of collective diplomacy," 5 but it
has also contributed to the formation of a uniform European Foreign Policy:
From the outside, the Community may still look like a strange
monster with many heads in the world of sovereign national states
which, at least in theory, determine international politics. In practice, however, the Community and the Nine manage to speak with
one voice more or less to the tune of their internal cohesion.06
In recent years, European Political Cooperation has produced

common Community policy on the rights of Palestinians,

eco-.

nomic sanctions against Iran, ss independence for Zimbabwe,6 9 and
70
denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
IV.

SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY
A.
1.

Treaty of Rome

Specific Treaty Provisions

Because the legal personality of an international organization is
the sum of its legal capacities, 1 it is necessary to examine not
only the capacities bestowed by integration on the European
Community, but also those capacities bestowed upon the Commu-

nity in specific treaty provisions. Additionally, European Court of
Justice decisions and customary practice providing for the transEURATOM, 13TH GEN. REP. 333 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 13TH GEN.

REP.].

The European Council, consisting of the Heads of State of the ten current members (Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the original "six" in
1973; Greece became a member in i980), meets at least three times a year to
supervise both the EPC and the Community. The representative of the Member
State who holds the Office of President of the Council presides over the European Council. E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROUCK, supra note 27, at 91.
65. Von der Goblentz, Luxembourg Revisited or the Importance of European Political Cooperation, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 685, 688 (1979).
66. Id. at 686.
67. See ECSC, EEC & EURATOM, 12TH GEN. REP. (1978) [hereinafter cited
as 12TH GEN. REP.]; 13TH GEN. REP., supra note 43; ECSC, EEC & EURATOM,
14TH GEN. REP. (1980) [hereinafter cited as 14TH GEN.
68. See 14TH GEN. REP., supra note 67.
69. See 13TH GEN. REP., supra note 64.
70. See 14TH GEN. REP., supra note 67.

71. See supra text accompanying notes 7-25.

REP.].
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fer of sovereignty from the Member States to the supranational
community have expanded EEC powers in directions not indi-

cated by a close reading of the Treaty articles alone. 2
Unlike the ECSC Treaty which established the ECSC, the EEC
Treaty does not expressly grant the Common Market legal personality in international relations. 78 Although the drafters of the
EEC Treaty explicitly provided in article 211 that the EEC have
"the most extensive legal capacity" in each of the Member
States,74 they desired to limit the international legal personality
of the EEC to those powers delineated in the Treaty.76 Since the
Member States had become worried about the degree of international legal personality possessed by the ECSC, they deliberately
omitted a general clause granting the EEC international legal per1
Nevertheless, since a number of other Treaty articles7
sonality.7
assume that the EEC has legal capacity to function in world commerce, "there is fairly general but not unanimous agreement
among writers that the Community has legal personality in the
'7
international field.
The external relations capacity of the Community does not differ greatly from the internal measures taken by the Member
States to further integration because it is both an element of integration and the manifestation of the Community's internal capacities. As evidenced by European Political Cooperation, this power
is an indicia of integration because it demonstrates the "evolution
towards a single representation of plural interests. 1 7 A concerted
external relations policy also enables the Community to present a
united front.8 0
According to international legal theorist David Ijalaye, "the
72. Pescatore, External Relations in the Case-Law of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 642 (1979).
73. Unlike article 6 of the ECSC Treaty, supra note 23, article 210 of the
EEC Treaty, supra note 26, makes no explicit statement about international
legal personality. Neither the Council nor the Commission has enacted measures
implementing EEC Treaty article 210 which states, "[t]he community shall have
legal personality."
74. EEC Treaty, supra note 26.
75. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 6-10.

76. Id.
77. EEC Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 111, 113, 114, 228, 231, 235, 237-238.

78. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 6.
79. Leopold, External Relations Power of the EEC in Theory and Practice,
26 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 54, 54 (1977).

80. Id. at 55.
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most salient evidence of legal personality under public international law is the right to conclude treaties."81 Article 228 of the
EEC Treaty provides the Community with rules for the conclusion of international agreements. s2 Although the Community has
not promulgated any regulations implementing article 228, every
time the Community concludes a treaty with a third state it effectuates the provision in practice. Common Market officials will repeat the steps taken in previous negotiations of agreements unless
a Member State or Community organ challenges their actions in
the Court.
Through customary practice, the Community has obtained considerable external relations power at the expense of the Member
States, but the Council has attempted to wrest this sovereign capacity from the Common Market.8 3 The Luxembourg Accords
stress that the Council, rather than the more supranational Commission, should be the institution most concerned with the Community's external relationships. 8 4 To this end, the Council has liberally interpreted EEC Treaty article 113 to allow it to appoint
special committees to oversee Commission negotiations. 5 Moreover, the Council does not consult the Parliament on a proposed
agreement until after it has signed the initiative.8 ' These maneu-

81. D. IJALAYE, THE EXTENSION OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 16 (1978).

82. Article 228 of the EEC Treaty provides:
1. Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between
the Community and one or more States or an international organisation,
such agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission. Subject to the
powers vested in the Commission in this field, such agreements shall be
concluded by the Council after the Assembly has been consulted in the

cases provided for by this Treaty.
The Council, the Commission or a Member State may... obtain [beforehand] the opinion of the Court of Justice as to the compatibility of the
contemplated agreements with the provisions of this Treaty. An agreement
which is the subject of a negative opinion of the Court of Justice may only
enter into force under the conditions laid down ... in Article 236.

2. Agreements concluded under [these] conditions... shall be binding
on the institutions of the Community. and on Member States.
EEC Treaty, supra note 26. This article complements articles 111, 113, and 114
concerning tariff and trade agreements and article 238 dealing with association
pacts with third states.
83. Leopold, supra note 79, at 64-65.
84. See supra note 50; Leopold, supra note 79, at 61.
85. Id. at 66.
86. Id. at 65.
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vers have hindered the transfer of sovereignty in certain aspects
of the treaty-making power envisioned by the EEC charter drafters; "so long as the Council is determined to ensure that the
treaty-making power of the Community develops along conventional inter-governmental lines, other aspects of the Community's
work will suffer and the political aims of the Community will not
7
be realised.

8'

The EEC Treaty and customary law also imbue the EEC with
powers in relationship to international organizations. Article 228
gives the Community the power to enter into treaties with third
states and also provides for the conclusion of agreements with international organizations.8 " Articles 229, 230, and 231 call for the
development of cooperation with the United Nations, the Council
of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the organs of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 9
At present, international law has not sufficiently progressed to
accord diplomatic privileges and immunities to the representatives of international organizations." As a consequence, the EEC
has not sent permanent diplomats to third states.9 1 The Court,
nevertheless, has given article 235 a broad reading so as to permit
the Common Market to send missions to third countries to deal
with problems within the EEC's competence.9 2 Since 1975 the
Community has enjoyed official observer status at the United Nations, which allows the Common Market representative to present
the position of the Community during General Assembly sessions.9 3 Under the authority of EEC article 116, the Community

has sent legations to economic international organizations., The
87. Id. at 71.

88. EEC Treaty, supra note 26.
89. See P.
(1980).

MATHIJESEN,

A GumE

TO EuROPEAN CoMMuNImT

LAW 206-07

90. Hunning, The European Communities and Public InternationalLaw, in
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF AN ENLARGED

EURoPEAN

COMMUNITY

132 (1972).

91. Id. at 131-32. The ECSC has a permanent mission in London. Le Tallec,
The Common Commercial Policy of the EEC, 20 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 732, 733
(1971).
92. Preliminary Ruling, Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey Ferguson
GmbH 1973 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 897 [1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8221. The EEC has designated these missions information and trade

offices.
93. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG,supra note 7, at 6-248.
94. Hunning, supra note 90, at 131.
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Common Market maintains permanent liaisons with GATT in
Geneva and OECD in Paris, 95 which differ from a diplomatic mis-

sion only in that the EEC has not appointed an ambassador. The
EEC has accredited over one hundred missions to third countries
via article 17 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of
the European Communities. 8
Under the authority of article 229, the Commission has participated in international conferences in many different capacities.9
Prior to the start of the United Nations Sugar Conference in
1968, the nations of Eastern Europe objected to the participation
of the EEC, claiming that the United Nations Charter permits
only states to become members of its agencies." Consequently, at
the conference, the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations
prepared an opinion on the status of the Common Market."" Determining that article 116 of the EEC Treaty bound the Member
States to proceed only by common action in respect to all matters
of particular interest to the Community, the Legal Affairs Office
realized that the Common Market would have to act for the
Member States if these nations were to have any treaty-making
capacity at the conference. Accordingly, the Legal Affairs Office
advised the United Nations to grant the EEC more rights than an
observer but less capacity than a state. 100
At the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, the
representative of the European Commission had to sit with the
delegation holding the chair of the Council of the European Communities during any given six-month period.10 1 The EEC was a

95. S. HENING, EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 6 (1971).
96. Protocol on Privileges and Immunities, the European Economic Community, Apr. 8, 1965, reprinted in TREATIES, supra note 3, at 815, 825.

97. Le Tallec, supra note 91, at 743.
98. Id.
99. Opinion Prepared for the United Nations Sugar Conference, [1968] U.N.
Y.B. 201.
100. Le Tallec, supra note 91, at 743. Before finalizing the agreement, the
conference inserted a special clause to enable the Community, an international

JURIDICIAL

organization, to sign and adhere to the agreement after its entry into force. Ultimately, the Common Market did not ratify the agreement, because it felt that
the export allocation was insufficient. Id. at 744.
101. Wellenstein, supra note 60, at 407, 417. Since the conference refused to
seat a delegate from an international organization, the EEC representative had

to take his place with a Member State delegation. Id. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in 14
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1292-1325 (1975), was signed by the President of the
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contracting party to the International Tin Agreement in 1971102
and also became a member of the International Wheat Council. 10 3
At the Law of the Sea Conference,' the Community had observer status. Since 1977 the President of the Commission has
participated in the economic world summits of the seven major
industrialized nations."1 5 Finally, the EEC delegation had status

coequal to that of state delegations at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (the North-South Dialogue). 10 6

2. Implied Powers
In addition to those specific EEC Treaty provisions granting

the Community external relations powers, the Common Market
has certain implied powers. Article 235 of the EEC Treaty allows
the Community to exercise those powers necessary to attain Common Market objectives. 107 This article allows the Community to
engage in international endeavors not specifically provided for in
the Treaty. 0 8 -Until 1973, the Commission's main application of
article 235 involved the enactment of agricultural trade and customs legislation. 10 9 The Final Communiqu6 of the 1972 Paris

Council, 12TH GEN. REP., supra note 67, at 264.
102. 15 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 90) 1 (1972), cited in Le Tallec, supra note
91, at 744; 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 1 (1976), cited in Le Tallec, supra
note 91, at 744.
103. 17 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 219) 24 (1974), cited in Le Tallec, supra
note 91, at 744.
104. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, [1978] 32
U.N.Y.B. 144; see e.g., 14TH GEN. REP., supra note 67.
105. 12TH GEN. REP., supra note 67; 13TH GEN. REP., supra note 64; 14TH
GEN. REP., supra note 67.
106. ECSC, EEC & EURATOM, 10TH GEN. REP. 235-36 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as 10TH GEN. REP.].
107. EEC Treaty, supra note 26. Article 235 provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course
of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously in a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures.
Id. In addition to the general objectives mentioned in EEC Treaty articles 2 and
3, subsequent articles provide more specific objectives of the Common Market.

Id. arts. 2, 3. EEC institutions have taken a liberal view of the term "objectives
of the Community." 5 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 6-289, 6-290.
108. 5 H. Smrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 6-15.
109. Id. at 6-276.
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Summit, 110 however, advocated the use of article 235 to implement science, energy, environment, and social reform policies.,1
Consequently, the Community has employed article 235 instead
of the article 236 amendment powers to broaden the scope of
Common Market activity.1 2 In fact, article 235 has become a ma1 13
jor source of power for the EEC in the foreign relations field.
Thus, the Community's exploitation of article 235 has obscured
the distinction between the powers extrinsic and those intrinsic to
the EEC Treaty.
B.

Judicial Decisions

Decisions of the European Court of Justice interpreting the
treaty-making powers of the Common Market have contributed
to the shaping of the scope of its international legal personality.
These cases provide another example of the transfer of sovereignty from the Member States to the Community and, therefore,
of the expansion of the legal personality of the EEC. Unlike article 101 of the EURATOM Treaty, which states that the external
relations power of the Community mirrors its internal capacities, 4 article 210 of the EEC Treaty does not delimit the external relations power of the Common Market.1 5 As outlined in the
previous section, 16 nevertheless, the Treaty of Rome expressly
empowers the Community to make three types of agreements
with third states or international organizations: (1) tariff and
trade agreements,11 7 (2) association pacts,' and (3) working relationships with international organizations.1 The question re110. ECSC, EEC & EURATOM, 6TH GEN. REP. 16 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as 6TH GEN. REP.].
111. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 6-279.
112. Id.
113. Some recent examples of the Community's utilization of article 235 as a
treaty-making power are the following: (1) Agreement on Registration of Congenital Abnormalities, July 24, 1979, EEC-Hellenic Republic, 22 O.J. EUR.
CoMm. (No. L 205) 27 (1979); (2) Agreement on Extension of EURONET to
Switzerland, Aug. 16, 1979, EEC-Switzerland, 22 O.J. EUR.

COMM.

(No. L 214)

18 (1979); (3) Convention on Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution, July 25,
1977, 20 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 240) 35 (1977).
114. EURATOM Treaty, supra note 41.
115. EEC Treaty, supra note 26.
116. See supra note 82.
117. EEC Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 111, 113, 114.
118. Id. art. 238.
119. Id. arts. 229-31.
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mained open, however, whether the Community could conclude
treaties on matters within its internal competence, but not expressly authorized by the EEC Treaty. 120 The Court addressed

this issue for the first time in Commission v. Council (European
Road Transport Agreement) (ERTA).1121
The ERTA case involved United Nations commission

22

negoti-

ations concerning the social conditions of European road transports. Over the course of time the Council developed regulations
in this area and the Council and Commission queried whether the
governments of the Member States or the Commission of the European Community should terminate the negotiations in the
United Nations. In the action brought by the Commission against
the Council, the Court decided that "whenever the Community
had, in whatever form, adopted common rules intended to implement the 'common policies' provided for by the Treaty, the Member States were no longer authorized, acting individually or even
jointly, to enter into binding contractual relationships with third
countries affecting these Common rules.''123 This decision was an
extension of the requirement in article 116 that Member States
yield sovereignty to the Common Market in those areas which the
EEC Treaty has given them no power of independent action.1 2
Since articles 3 and .75 of the EEC Treaty called for a common
transport policy and the Council had enacted regulations furthering this policy, the Court determined that the Community had
the exclusive right to negotiate the agreement. 25 In effect, the
Court had established the principle that the Community had international legal capacity in areas other than those expressly provided for in the EEC Treaty. The Community could exercise powers externally on the basis of Treaty provisions for which it had
adopted implementing measures internally.122 The 1976 Cornelius
120. Pescatore, supra note 72, at 615, 618.
121. 1971 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 263, [1971] 10 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 335.
122. This Commission is the Economic Commission for Europe of the United
Nations. 10 COMM. MKT. L. REv.at 336.
123. 5 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 6-11.
124. Hunning, supra note 90. Article 234 applies this principle to rights and
obligations arising from agreements concluded before the effective date of the

Treaty of Rome by requiring the Member States to take all necessary steps to
make their prior agreements compatible with the dictates of the Community
Treaty. Id. at 128.
125.

H.

SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note

126. Id. at 6-11.

7, at 6-12.
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Kramer Advisory Opinion 12 7 affirmed this result.
The ERTA and Kramer cases, however, left unresolved the
question of whether the capacity of the Community to become a
party to international agreements in areas in which it had no explicit treaty authority to act depended on th prior promulgation
of rules on those subjects. Opinion 1/76128 of the Court addressed
this issue. The case involved the legality of an agreement signed
by the Community, most Member States, and Switzerland for reducing excess shipping capacity on the Rhine. Similar to the
ERTA case, Opinion 1/76 concerned whether EEC Treaty articles
3 and 75, calling for a common transport policy, granted treatymaking powers to the Commission. Unlike the ERTA case, the
Community had not adopted any internal measures governing the
subject matter of the agreement. The Court ruled that the Community had validly participated in the agreement and therefore:
"[t]he rule, stated in'the ERTA case and in Kramer, that the
Community had the power to enter into international agreements
on topics for which the Treaty gave it no direct power to do so
only if it had already adopted pertinent internal measures, was
. . . abandoned." ' This decision established the precedent that
the EEC has external relations capacity in areas in which it has
not enacted any implementing measures. The Common Market
may negotiate treaties pertaining to the general objectives of the
Community set out in the Treaty of Rome.
Opinion 1/76 was significant in another respect. Since the
treaty modified pre-existing obligations of the member states, the
Court permitted their participation in the agreement. 130 Accordingly, the Court sanctioned mixed agreements, those treaties
signed by the Community and the Member States. 131 Consequently, Opinion 1/76 stood for the proposition that the EEC
Treaty does not prohibit the conclusion of mixed agreements
whenever an agreement concerns those powers still within the
sovereignty of a Member State.13 2 This ruling restricts the EEC's

power over external relations by suggesting that Member State
127.

Officer Van Justitie v. Kramer, 1976 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1297, [1976] 2

CoMM. MKT. L. REV. 440.

128. Opinion Given Pursuant to Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, Jan. 1976,
1977 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 741, [1977] 2 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 279.
129. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 6-12.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Pescatore, supra note 72, at 623.
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ratification is necessary to give Community treaties international

approval. Furthermore, the Council can determine, at its discretion, when Member States can participate in any treaty-making
process. 13 3 Nonetheless, the Community enters into many agreements as the sole signatory on behalf of the Member States. 13 4
Although Opinion 1/76 greatly expanded the EEC's international legal personality, it provided no guidance on the issue of
the legality of treaties concluded on the basis of the implied powers of article 235. To date, the Court has rendered no opinion on
this question, but current Community practice validates these undertakings. 13 5 Consequently, specific Treaty provisions and implied powers have granted the European Community a variable
international legal personality which continues to grow in scope
as the Member States directly or indirectly transfer their sovereign powers to the Community in the process of integration.
V. FINANCIAL AUTONOMY FOR THE COMMUNITY
A.

Council Decision of April 21, 1970136

The Council Decision of April 21, 1970 laid the foundation for
the most significant move toward integration to date, namely the
establishment of financial autonomy for the Community in relation to its Member States. The Decision links two themes that
pervade the evolution of the Community budget system from national contributions to financial autonomy: (1) the increase of the
European Parliament's powers over the budget vis-a-vis the
Council, and (2) the replacement of Member State contributions

by the Community's own resources and a form of direct taxing
power.13 7 This section will trace these two trends through Community history for the purpose of demonstrating how the struggle
over the power of the purse has affected the international legal
personality of the Common Market by producing a transfer of
133. See Leopold, supra note 79, at 64-65.
134. Id. at 63. The fact that article 228 binds the Member States to agreements reached by the Community, even though they are not contracting parties,
is a revolutionary development in the law of international organizations. See Le
Tallec, supra note 91, at 744.
135. See supra notes 107 & 113 and accompanying text for the language of
article 235, a discussion of the implied powers doctrine, and a partial list of
treaties concluded on the basis of the article.
136. Treaties, supra note 3.
137. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 5-677.
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sovereignty from the member states to the Community, thus fur-

thering European integration.
Pursuant to EEC Treaty article 246(2), interest-free advances
from the Member States to the Community initially financed the
Common Market. 138 The Community credited these advances to

the Member States' contributions when the Six promulgated their
budget for the first financial year.13 9 Since the Member States
could not agree on a uniform scale of percentage contributions for
all types of Community expenditures, they developed a social and

political scale for contributions. 1 0 The EEC administrative
budget (political scale) and the European Social Fund (social
scale) set out the percentages of Member State contributions.

In 1961, the Council established a third scale to fund the agricultural policy of the Community.14 2 During this stage of Common
Market financing, the Member States refused to surrender
14 3
financial autonomy to the supranational Community.
In 1965, the Commissson, acting under the authority of EEC
Treaty article 201, proposed that the Community replace the sys138. EEC Treaty, supra note 26; I. DRaiKR, FINANCING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 241 (1975).
139. I. DRUKER, supra note 138, at 241.
140. Id.
141. Members contributed to the Community according to the following
scale:
State

% Political Scale

% Social Scale

Belgium

7.9

8.8

Germany

28.0

32.0

France

28.0

32.0

Italy

28.0

20.0

Luxembourg

0.2

0.2

Netherlands

7.9

7.0

EEC Treaty, supra note 26, art. 200. "Each scale was the result of hard bargaining, and
reflects a balance among the relative economic strengths and financial capabilities of the
Member States, considerations of national prestige, and the benefits of each anticipated at
the time." I. DROKER, supra note 138, at 242 (1975).
142. I. DROKER, supra note 138, at 242; Budget Treaty of 1970, supra note
30, at 4. The EEC established the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to ensure
security of food supplies, stabilize commodity prices, and make farming more
efficient. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, GIST: THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY (Aug. 1979). The CAP absorbs two-thirds of the Community's $25
billion budget. THE ECONOMIST, POLITICAL EUROPE 4 (1979).
143. I. DROKER, supra note 138, at 241.
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tern of financing through Member State contributions with a
scheme of its own resources.""' The anti-European sentiments of
French President Charles de Gaulle, however, precluded any discussion of this issue until his death in 1969.145 In July of that
year, the Commission proposed the establishment of a self-sufficient system of Community financing through its own resources. 146 After examining these recommendations, the Council
promulgated the Decision of April 21, 1970, which finalized the
understanding reached earlier at the Hague Summit of December
1969 and established a timetable for the replacement of financial

contributions from Member States with the Community's own resources. 147 The new techniques of budget finance for the transi-

tion to financial autonomy became operational in fiscal year
1971.148 A new single scale for Member State contributions replaced the old political and social scales.1 49 Revenues from the
common customs tariff and agricultural levies were paid directly
to the Community. 150 Additionally, the Decision gave the Parliament sole responsibility for its own budget.' 51
According to the timetable in the Council Decision of April 21,
1970, the drafters of the agreement intended that revenues from
not more than one percent of a value added tax based on a uniform assessment would replace Member State contributions by
fiscal year 1975.152 Since the Council could not come to an agreement on an assessment policy, however, it became impossible to
use the value added tax as a part of the Community's own
144. EEC COMM'N Doc. (No. 65) 150 (1965), supra note 43. This proposal
was part of the package deal which became the focus of the constitutional crisis
of 1965. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 28, at 131.
145. I. DRIJKER, supra note 138, at 4.

146. EEC COMM'N Doc. (No. 69) 700 (1969) cited in 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG,
supra note 7, at 5-252.
147. I. DRUKER, supra note 138, at 252; Treaties, supra note 3.

148. EEC Treaty, supra note 26, art. 203. The fiscal year runs concurrently
with the calendar year. Id.
149. I. DROKER, supra note 138, at 254.
150. EEC Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 18-29. The Community receives the
revenues from these duties and levies subject to a ten percent rebate retained by
the Member States to cover collection costs. Id.

151. Resolutions and Declarations Recorded in the Minutes of the Meeting
of the Council on 22 April 1970, Resolution No. 1, reprintedin TREATIES, supra
note 3, at 885.
152. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 28, at 131.
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resources in 1975.153 The Nine maintained their voluntary contri-.
butions in the interim period to continue the operations of the
Common Market.154 By 1977, the Council had developed a substantially uniform basis for assessment of the value added tax.""
The adoption of national laws implementing this directive was
slow, however, and Member State contributions continued to provide funds through fiscal year 1978.156 In 1979, all but three Member States15" were paying a percentage of their value added -tax to

the Community. " 8 Since January 1, 1980, all Member States furnish the Community with their customs duties, agricultural levies,
and a percentage of their value added tax-the Community's own
resources. 159 As of that date, the Common Market has financial
autonomy.
B. Budget Treaties of 1970160 and 1975161
Since its creation, the European Parliament has struggled for
greater control over the Community budget. 16 2 Although the Parliament had the authority to draft its own budget estimates and
debate the amount of the expenditure, the Council had virtually
full decision-making power over the budget of the EEC.163 Parliament made its first effort to gain control over the budgetary pro153. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 5-680.
154. Id. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the Community
in 1973. Treaty Concerning the Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United
Kingdom to the European Communities, Jan. 22, 1972, 15 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No.
L 73) 5 (1972), reprinted in TREATIES, supra note 3, at 981.
155. Harmonization of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Turnover
Taxes, Common System of the Value Added Tax, 6th Council Directive, May 17,
1977, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 145) 1 (1977).
156. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 5-681.
157. The recalcitrant states were Ireland, Luxembourg, and West Germany,
see id. at 5-673.
158. Id. at 5-681.
159. Id. at 5-673.
160. Budget Treaty of 1970, supra note 47.
161. Treaty Amending Certain Financial Provisions of the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and the Treaty Establishing a Single Council

and and a Single Commission of the European Communities, July 22, 1975, 20
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 359) 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Budget Treaty of
19751.
162. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 28, at 131.
163. Id. at 131. The European Parliament had full power over that percentage of the budget allocated to it from levies collected by the ECSC. Id.
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cess in 1963 in connection with the agricultural fund. 6 4 The
Council frustrated this effort, however, and also a subsequent initiative submitted by the Commission with the reforms package of
1965.165 Not until the Hague Summit of December 1969 did the
Council concur that the Parliament should have increased budgetary powers.1ie
The Budget Treaty of 197017 was signed one day after the
Council Decision of April 21, 1970. In its preamble, the Six,
"[c]onsidering that the replacement of financial contributions of
Member States by the Communities' own resources requires a
strengthening of the budgetary powers of the Assembly,
[r]esolved to associate the Assembly closely in the supervision of
the implementation of the budget of the Communities."'6 The
Parliament acquired the power to make modifications to the draft
budget prepared by the Council. Despite its opposition to integrationist trends, France signed the Budget Treaty of 1970 because

it believed that giving the European Parliament a greater role in
budget formation would better protect the common agricultural
policy from attack by those Member States that did not receive
its benefits.1i 9
The Six decided to implement the Budget Treaty of 1970 in
two stages. For the years 1971-1974, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, had absolute discretion to modify and adopt the
Community budget. 170 When the Parliament submitted an
amendment that did not increase the aggregate expenditure of an
institution, the Council needed a qualified majority to reject the
proposal. 7 1 In all other cases a qualified majority was required to
approve the modification.1 7 2 On January 1, 1975, the Community
164. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 5-677.
165. Id. at 5-698; see supra text accompanying notes 42-56.
166. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 28, at 132; Budget Treaty of 1970,
supra note 47.
167. Budget Treaty of 1970, supra note 47.
168. Id. at 2. "Democratic Holland was prepared to allow the EEC to raise
revenue directly . . . only if the European parliament were given some say in

the matter." The Economist, supra note 142, at 3.
169. The Economist, supra note 142, at 3.
170. 5 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 5-678. Pursuant to the Decision on Replacement of Financial Contributions, the Council can make no
amendments to Parliament's estimate of its own expenditures, unless the figures
conflict with Community law. TREATIES, supra note 3.
171. 5 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 5-678.
172. Budget Treaty of 1970, supra note 47, art. 5.
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budget came out from under the supervision of the Council when
the European Parliament acquired complete control over
noncompulsory budget expenditures' 73 including the power to
amend and adopt the budget. 17" The noncompulsory expenditures

make up less than one-third of the total budget, consisting mainly
of outlays for administration and social programs. 17 5 Nevertheless, as one commentator observed:
The political importance of this control may be found to outreach
the amount of money actually involved. Control over the free part
of the budget will give the Assembly important powers in relation
to the activities of the other institutions of the Communities because he who holds the purse strings can effectively control the
means whereby the independent functioning of the other institu17 6
tions of the Communities is guaranteed.

In the same year that the Parliament obtained these new powers
concerning noncompulsory expenditures, the Member States
passed the Budget Treaty of 1975177 enhancing the Assembly's
control over the entire budget.
The Budget Treaty of 1975 gives the Parliament the authority
to reject the entire draft budget and demand that the Council
submit a new budget. 78s Additionally, the Joint Declaration of the
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 79 proclaimed the same year, provides the Assembly with the opportunity to initiate a conciliation procedure in the event the Parliament and Council cannot agree on a policy having "appreciable
financial implications."'' s0 Before examining the Parliament's exercise of these new budgetary powers, it is essential to discuss another structural reform in the Community that has led to greater
European integration.
173. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 28, at 132. When the Community
treaties, secondary legislation, international conventions, or private law contracts prescribe the principle and amount of expenditure (either a figure or a
determinative price mechanism) the budgetary item is considered compulsory.
D.

(1977).
Budget Treaty of 1970, supra note 47, art. 4.
5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG,supra note 7, at 5-678.
D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 28, at 132.
Budget Treaty of 1975, supra note 161.
Id. art. 12(8).
18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 89) 22 (1975), reprinted in TREATIES, supra
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174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

note 3, at 900 ed. n.
180. Id.
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C. Direct Elections to the European Parliament
Article 138 of the EEC Treaty provided that the national parliaments of the Member States nominate delegates to the European Assembly from among their own members.""" The Six appointed the original Members of the European Parliament (MEP)
in numbers corresponding to the strength of the political parties
in their national parliaments.1 8 2 In 1960, the assembly, acting
pursuant to the same article 138, prepared a draft convention for
the election of the MEP by direct universal suffrage.1 83 Since the
Council found that direct elections would increase the legitimacy
and, by implication, the power of the European Parliament, 1" it
refused to reach a decision on the draft convention. 8 5 Frustrated
with Council inaction on its proposal for direct elections, in 1969
the Assembly threatened to take the Council to Court. 18 Seven
years later, the nine Member States signed an Act Concerning the
Election of Representatives of the Assembly by Direct Universal
Suffrage (Election Act). 87 The world's first transnational election
was held June 7-10, 1979, with sixty-one percent of the eligible
188
European electorate voting.
181. EEC Treaty, supra note 26.
182. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 28, at 125.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 126. In actuality, the Council had little reason to worry, because
the legislative and budgetary powers of the Parliament were quite limited at

that time. The Treaty of Rome grants the Assembly no power to initiate, pass,
or block legislation. According to EEC Treaty article 144, the Parliament, by a

two-thirds majority of votes cast, may censure the Commission and force it to
resign as a body. EEC Treaty, supra note 26. Although this power is unique in

that no other international organization possesses this capacity, nothing prevents the Council from reappointing the same individuals to the Commission.
Otherwise, article 140 provides Parliament with the ability to hold the Commission accountable only by submitting written questions to the Commission for

comment. Id. The Parliament has never exercised its authority to take another
Community institution to the Court. See 4 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 7,
at 5-423, 5-424.
185. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 28, at 126.
186. Id. The Parliament passed a resolution urging the Council to take action on the proposal. See id. at 126 n.10. The resolution referred to EEC Treaty
article 175 which permits- the Assembly to take the Council to the Court for
failure to act on a request of the Parliament. Id.
187. Sept. 20, 1976, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 278) 1 (1976). [hereinafter cited
as Election Act].
188. The Economist, supra note 142, at 3. EEC Treaty article 138(3) and
article 7 of the Election Act mandated that the Assembly draw up a proposal for
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Apart from establishing an element of direct control in the
Community, the implementation of direct universal suffrage may
have a long-term effect on Community-Member State relations
and therefore on European integration. Some of the immediate
consequences of direct elections are already apparent. The Election Act increased the size of the Parliament from 198 to 410
members,18 establishing a greater physical presence. Unlike their
predecessors, MEP have attempted to attract media attention to
highlight their actions on their constituent's behalf. 190 And since
the MEP are no longer affiliated with their national parliaments,
they have acted with a greater concern for Europe than for na19
tional considerations. '
D.

The New Parliament

During the past decade the European Community acquired
financial autonomy in relation to its Member States. The creation
of the Community's own resources simultaneously prompted the
grant of increased budgetary powers to the Parliament vis-a-vis
the Council. 92 Both developments have further integrated the
Common Market and resulted in the transfer of sovereignty from
nation-states to the supranational organization. The European
Parliament, composed of directly elected representatives, now
controls a Community budget in excess of twenty-five billion dola uniform electoral procedure. EEC Treaty, supra note 19; Election Act, supra
note 187. Because no plan was ready for the first election in 1979, the Member

States conducted the elections in accordance with their national voting methods.
P. MATHIJSEN, supra note 89, at 18.
189. Election Act, supra note 187. When Greece became the tenth member
of the Community on January 1, 1981, the total MEP increased to 434. Documents Concerning the Accession of the Hellenic Republic to European Community, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 291) 1, 21 (1979).

190. Lodge, The Significance of Direct Elections for the European Parliament's Role in the European Community and the Drafting of a Common Electoral Law, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 195, 201-03 (1979). This predilection can be
observed in Parliament's use of the conciliation procedure with the Council in
areas other than budgetary matters such as exploitation of general and special

committees to question and investigate the activities of the Commission, and its
issuance of policy resolutions as an indirect means of initiating legislation. Id.;

see also Herman, Direct Elections to the European Parliament:Comparative
Perspectives, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 209 (1979).
191. Lodge, supra note 190, at 203.
192. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 5-677.
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lars. 1' 3 By placing the power of the purse in the hands of the Parliament, the Member States have given the European Community
an attribute of sovereignty which should substantially bolster its
claim for international legal personality.
The budgetary debates of the past three years provide an indication of the extent to which the Parliament has exercised its

newly acquired sovereign powers. Throughout the 1970s the Assembly expressed its dissatisfaction with the high percentage of
the budget devoted to the common agricultural policy.19 4 The
Parliament wanted to direct a greater portion of its spending towards regional aid and industrial development.19 5 The Budgetary
Treaties of 1970 and 1975 gave the Parliament the necessary authority to reallocate budget priorities and amend the 1979 draft
budget to increase expenditure for the European Regional
the
Fund.1 96 Despite the Council's objection to this modification,
97
adopted.
budget
the
declared
President of the Assembly
The same wrangle over budget priorities occurred a year later.
This time, however, the 1980 draft budget came under the review
of the new directly elected Parliament. 98 The Council rejected
Parliament's amendments to the budget which mandated increases for social and regional development.' 99 Consequently, the
Assembly, exercising for the first time the powers given to it by
the Budget Treaty of 1975, rejected the budget in toto.20 0 Since
the Council could not submit a new draft budget before the beginning of the fiscal year, the Community adopted a special Sup-

193.

194.

Budget Treaty of 1970, supra note 47, at 4.
5 H. SMiT & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 5-683.

195. Id.
196. Id. The Regional Fund is an instrument used to transfer supplementary
resources to the poorest regions of the Community. P. MATMJSEN, supra note
89, at 179-86.

197. The 1980/1981 Budget Wrangle, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 5 (1981). Because the Council could not get a qualified majority to accept the amendment,
the proposed modification was rejected. See Budget Treaty of 1975, supra note
161, art. 203(5), (6). The Council, nevertheless, could not achieve a qualified majority to fix another rate of expenditure. Subsequently, a conflict arose between
the Council and Parliament concerning the amendment. As a consequence, a
compromise budget was adopted for 1979. See Sopwith, Legal Aspects of the
Community Budget, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 315, 333-40 (1980).
198. 5 H. Smrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 43, at 5-683.
199. Id. at 5-683; see Sopwith, supra note 197, at 340-45.
200. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 5-683.
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plementary and Amending Budget for 1980.201
In preparing the draft budget for 1981, the Parliament realized
that the Community, under the 1980 provisional budget, had not
spent its allowable appropriation for regional and social expenditures. 2 Accordingly, it decided to insert the additional regional
and social expenditures it had hoped to make in the 1981 budget
into the second Supplementary and Amending Budget for 1980.203
The Assembly adopted both the 1980 and 1981 budgets in December 1980.2°4 Questioning the legality of the Parliament's budgetary maneuverings, France, Belgium, and West Germany refused

in the
to pay for the extra expenditures approved by Parliament
5
20
second 1980 Supplementary and Amending Budget.
The Commission had the authority, under EEC Treaty article
169, to bring these states before the Court for failure to comply
with Community obligations. °8 Since it wanted to avoid a showdown between the Court and a Member State similar to that
which occurred with France in the, "British Lamb War," the Commission was reluctant to take that step.207 Obviously, noncompliance with Court decisions signifies a lack of interest in the common objectives of the EEC-an anti-integrationist stance which
weakens the European Community's claim to a more comprehensive international legal personality.
Concerned that these rumblings about Member State sovereignty in relation to the EEC budget might escalate into a major
problem, a Member State of the European Parliament submitted

201. The 1980/1981 Budget Wrangle, supra note 197.
202. Id. Article 203 of the EEC Treaty directs the Commission to establish a
maximum rate of increase over the previous year in total expenditure for a par-

ticular type of budget appropriation. EEC Treaty, supra note 26.
203. The 1980/1981 Budget Wrangle, supra note 197.
204. See id.
205.

When the budget dispute of 1981 ended, Belgium, France, and West

Germany did not have to pay the disputed additional contribution. [1981] CoMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) Report No. 415.
206. EEC Treaty, supra note 26.
207. This development represents a clear example of state sovereignty winning over the principle of supranationality. See The Mutton and Lamb Story:
Isolated Incident or the Beginning of a New Era?, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 311
(1980). The British Lamb War invrolved French refusal to comply with court

rulings to alter its import arrangements for mutton and lamb which contravened
Community law concerning the free movement of goods within the EEC. Id. at

311.
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a written question20 " to the Commission in the summer of 1981
requesting an opinion on the financial autonomy of the Community.20 9 The Commission's response stated that it was "essential
to make a clear distinction between own resources and tax revenue for national budgets."21 0 Member States merely act as clearing houses between individual taxpayers paying customs duties or

value added tax and the Community, which becomes the ultimate
recipient and user of the revenue.2 11
VI.

STATE SOVEREIGNTY V. SUPRANATIONALITY

The Commissson's response 2 12 has much more significance than
merely reaffirming the decision granting financial autonomy to
the Community.21 3 More than any of the aforementioned Treaty
amendments and judicial decisions that have promoted the move
toward integration, the response underscores the meaning of
supranationality in relation to the Community. It implicitly requires a Member State either to comply with Community law or
leave the Common Market. No state may threaten to withhold
the Community's entitlement on the basis of a disagreement with
EEC policies or decisions. The supranational institution thus
prevails over state sovereignty. The concluding sections of this
Recent Development will discuss the concepts of state sovereignty, supranationality, and international legal personality in relation to the theory of recognition.
Under traditional theories of international law only sovereign
states can possess international legal personality.2
Moreover,
only a single sovereignty can occupy a given territory. 215 Since
there can only be one supreme power, sovereignty is indivisible. 1 6
According to this theory, an alignment between states exists only

on the basis of coordination and cooperation. No sharing, surren208.

Written Question No. 2053/80 24 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 168) 4 (1981)

(submitted by Mr. Notenboom, Member of the European Parliament).
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See supra note 64 for a discussion of the power to submit questions.
Written Question No. 2053/80, supra note 208.
Id.
Id.
See Treaties, supra note 3.
See supra p. 1; T. HOLLAND, supra note 8, at 395.

214.
215. 3 P.

PESCATORE, THE LAW OF INTEGRATION: EMERGENCE OF A NEW PE-

NONMENON IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EuROPEAN COMMUNITIES 30

216.

Id. at 31.

(1974).
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dering, or transferring of sovereignty occurs between international
organizations and their constituent states. Consistent with these
teachings, article 2 of the United Nations Charter proclaims that
all members have sovereign equality and that their sovereignty
remains intact.2117 Proponents of the traditional ideas argue that
the state accedes to a system of integration by transferring competences, not sovereign powers. 18
This theory, at least as applied to the European Community, is
not in accord with reality. EEC institutions would have no power
unless the Member States had given up a degree of their soevereignty. The Member States have done more than grant the Common Market certain competences; they have surrendered to the
Common Market fundamental and vital state functions, namely
the formulation of policy, legislation, and the administration of
justice. As the ERTA case219 indicates, only the Court has the
power to decide cases involving the exclusive right of Community
institutions to legislate involving the EEC's power to develop a
common transport policy. Unlike Member States participating in
some international organizations, the states forming the Common
Market cannot denounce any obligation to the European Community in the name of state sovereignty.220 As early as 1963, the
Court ruled:
[B]y creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own
institutions, its own personality and its own capacity in law, apart
from having international standing and more particularly, real

powers resulting from a limitation of competence or a transfer of
powers from the States to the Community, the Member States, al-

beit within limited spheres, have restricted their sovereign rights
and created221
a body of law applicable both to their nationals and to

themselves.

The European Community is truly an international organization
pas comme les autres.
The powers that the Member States have conferred on the or-

gans of the Common Market have initiated new principles of
representativity in international law. The Council serves as the
217. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1; see P. PESCATORE, supra note 215, at 30.
218. P. PESCATORE, supra note 215, at 30-32.
219. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
220. P. PESCATORE, supra note 215, at 50.
221. Costa v. Enel, 1964 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1143, [1964] 3 CoMM. MKT. L.
REv. 425, 455.

Spring 19821

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

guardian of the interests of the Member States.222 When a Treaty
amendment or treaty of accession comes before the Council, each
Member State has veto power.223 In other situations, the Council
functions by a qualified majority vote.224 Safeguarding the common interests of the Community, the Commission has directed
the transition of the EEC from a customs union to an economic
and, in some respects, a political union. 225 The directly elected

European Parliament introduces the novel concept of democratic
control in an international organization. Finally, the Court serves
objectives of the "constitution" of the Euas the guarantor of the
228
ropean Community.

The constituent documents of the European Community are
more than just treaties; they form a contract between the Member States and the Community. Community powers come from
the Member States, but in the final analysis this grant of powers
creates a quasi-federal body in some respects more powerful than
the states themselves.227 The conferral of powers has resulted in a
division of authority between the Community and Member
States. The European Community shares its powers with Member
States by assuming the responsibility of producing international
policies and legislation in certain areas while giving the states the
task of implementation and execution of its directives. 228 Accordingly, the powers are autonomous, not concurrent. For this reason, the Court has deemed it necessary in some instances for both
the Community and Member States to become parties to international agreements. 229 Both actors are competent in the areas of

their respective sovereignty. This multiple division of powers on
both the substantive and functional level has given the Community certain characteristics of a federation.

A federation is a union of several states based on an international treaty, which is later followed by the creation of a constitution which creates organs of the union possessing powers over the
member states and their citizens. 2 30 The European Community
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

P. PESCATORE, supra note 215, at 6.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 54.
P. PESCATORE, supra note 215, at 6.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
R. GURLAND & A. MACLEAN, supra note 44, at 28.
P. PESCATORE, supra note 215, at 44.
Id. at 47.
C. OKEKE, CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
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falls short of this definition in only a few respects. It does not yet
have a constitution which the Member States may amend without
unanimous consent. Moreover, the EEC Treaty does not require
that the Common Market conduct unitary external relations in all
areas. And yet, the European Community is more than a partnership of states or a confederation. On a continuum of governmental structures, the Common Market falls somewhere between an
intergovernmental organization and a federation. Political and legal theorists have classified it as a supranationality2 31
The term supranational first appeared in conjunction with the
Common Market in article 9 of the ECSC Treaty. 3 2 Since the
concept has application in cases in which international integrative
movements have placed sophisticated restrictions on state sovereignty, supranationalism is now commonly used to describe the
European Community.23 3 Three fundamental aspects of supranationalism define the term and help distinguish the Community
from other international organizations. First, a supranationality
possesses a complex of common values.2 The Member States
subordinate their national interests to the common objectives of
the Community; they emphasize the value of economic union
through the Common Market over national value hierarchies.
Second, a supranationality places real power at the service of
common interests. 3 5 The Parliament, Council, and Commission
have defined powers and the Court renders decisions that bind
the Member States. Last, a supranationality utilizes its powers

independently of its Member States.23 6 A supranational organization transcends rules of sovereign equality and nonintervention.
Although treaty amendments and treaties of accession remain
LAW 38 (1974).

231. I. CLAUDE, SWORDS IN THE PLOWSHARES 379-80 (4th ed. 1971); Robertson, Legal Problems of EuropeanIntegration, 91 RECUEIL DES COURS 105, 14348 (1957).
232. Article 9 of the ECSC Treaty, supra note 34, was subsequently repealed
by article 19 of the Merger Treaty, supra note 35.

233. F. GRIEVES, supra note 47, at 10-18.
234. P. PESCATORE, supra note 215, at 50-51; see F. GRIEVES, supra note 47,
at 10-18.
235. P. PESCATORE, supra note 215, at 50. This principle distinguishes the
European Community from most international organizations that have developed a reputation for the absence or ineffectiveness of their powers. Id. at 60;
see F. GRIEVES, supra note 47, at 15.
236. P. PESCATORE, supra note 215, at 51; see F. GRIEVES, supra note 47, at

14.
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subject to the unanimity rule, the Council implements most Common Market policies by the vote of a qualified majority. 237 In ar-

eas of Community sovereignty, the Member States have no right
of independent action.2"8 By combining the three criteria of common objective, reality of power, and autonomy, the integration
movement has advanced the European Community beyond all
other international organizations in acquiring the characteristics
of supranationality.
VII.

CONCLUSION: RECOGNITION

While few commentators question the international status of
the Community in relation to the Member States and those countries with which it has negotiated treaties, the question of
whether the Common Market possesses a universally recognizable
personality remains open.239 In determining the international status of the United Nations, the ICJ in the Reparations Case

stated that fifty states, "representing the vast majority of the
members of the international community, had the power in conformity with international law to bring into being an entity possessing an objective international personality and not only personality recognized by them alone.

' 240

If this recognition standard

determines when an entity has international legal personality,
then the increasing membership in the Common Market may indicate that it has objective international personality. Furthermore, over fifty states have implicitly recognized the EEC by entering into commercial negotiations with it or sending diplomatic
missions to it.

241

This standard, however, is based on the constitutive theory of
recognition.242 Under this theory, international legal persons must
recognize an entity as having the attributes of legal personality
before international law will allow it to acquire rights and duties
within the legal system. 243 Most international jurists have discred237.

See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.

238. P.

PESCATORE,

supra note 215, at 33.

239.
240.
241.
SMIT &

D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 28, at 24.
Reparations Case, supra note 10, at 178-79.
E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 27, at 935; see also 5 H.
P. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 606.
242. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMrr,INTERNATIONAL LAW 171

(1980).
243. E.

STEIN,

P.

HAY & M. WAELBROECK,

supra note 27, at 932.

3,14

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:309

ited the constitutive theory of recognition because it leaves the
important act of identifying the subjects of international law to
the whim of nation-states. Constitutive theory permits a state
to deny the existence of an international organization as an international legal personality, yet expect it to observe the law of nations.

2 5

Since this theory has lost favor in international law as a

standard for recognizing states, it should not serve as the standard for recognition of international organizations as international legal persons. Instead, declaratory theory should govern
recognition. Declaratory theory accords international legal personality to an entity once it has fulfilled the conditions for recognition.24 6 Recognition merely acknowledges the fact of the entity's

political existence and declares the recognizing state's willingness
2 ,7
to treat it as an international person.

Unlike the criteria used to determine statehood (territory, population, government, and international capacity), there are no objective criteria for the recognition of international organizations.248 Identifying the capacities of an international organization
that accord it recognition as a legal personality is a complex task.
This Recent Development has proposed that the attributes of

supranationality-common objectives, reality of power, and autonomy-are the relevant capacities. The Common Market has
acquired the attributes of supranationality as the trend toward
integration, highlighted by the Commission's response to the
written question on financial autonomy of the Community, 24 9 has

led to the transfer of sovereignty from the Member States to the
supranational organization. Accordingly, the European Community should have a measure of international legal personality commensurate with its possession of these attributes.
At this juncture-after twenty-five years of EEC existence-the
European Community will itself decide the scope of its international legal personality. Will it advance toward economic and
political integration or become an intergovernmental customs
union run by sovereign states? Ultimately, the outcome will depend on whether the supranational organs of the Community con244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
B. BOT, NONRECOGNITION AND TREATY RELATIONS 17 (1968).
W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 283 (1962).
L. HENIUN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. Smrr, supra note 242, at 171.
248. C. OKEKE, supra note 230, at 187-88.

249. See supra notes 208, 209 & 210 and accompanying text.
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tinue to increase their powers or whether the proponents of state
sovereignty limit the role of the Common Market institutions to
functional bureaucracy.
Platte B. Moring, III

